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    Abstract  
 
A growing body of research has contributed to understanding the 
labor market and political effects of globalization. This paper 
explores an overlooked aspect of trade-induced adjustments in 
the labor market: the institutional aspect. We take advantage of 
the two-tier collective bargaining structure of the Italian labor 
market, whereby the first tier entails setting minimum wages at the 
contract level. Using an instrumental variable strategy and 
exploiting variations in contract-level exposure to trade, we find for 
the 1995-2003 period that on average, the surge in imports 
decreased contractual minimum wages by 1.5%. This impact 
increased with the increase in the share of unskilled workers 
employed under this contract. This negative institutional effect 
contrasts with a nonsignificant effect of trade on total wages, with 
the latter becoming positive and large only for highly skilled 
workers. 
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In recent decades, institutions such as centralized bargaining, firing costs and minimum wages 
have been key to enhancing social protection, wage compression, and job security and stability 
(Card, 1996; Di Nardo et al., 1996). Historically, centralized wage bargaining and firing costs 
have been curbed in response to competitiveness concerns (Freeman and Gibbons, 1995). As 
suggested by Alesina and Giavazzi (2008), institutional changes aimed at reducing social 
protection may be the only viable solution to compete with countries whose social contracts 
entail a significantly lower degree of protection, especially for the least-skilled workers. 
However, the loss of social protection for the sake of international competition might lead 
unskilled and vulnerable workers in developed countries to embrace populistic political 
platforms (Autor et al, 2016, Colantone and Stanig, 2018), which could eventually establish an 
even less efficient and politically dangerous form of social protection (i.e., protectionism).  
Theoretically, several papers have contributed to our understanding of the effect of skill-
biased shocks, including technological change and the surge of massive economies such as 
China and India, on institutions. Acemoglu et al. (2001) model deunionization as a response to 
skill-biased technological changes reducing skilled workers’ incentives to maintain a coalition 
with unskilled workers. Ebell and Haefke (2006) extend the seminal paper of Blanchard and 
Giavazzi (2003) to show that an increase in product market competition, including international 
competition (Mezzetti and Dinopoulos, 1991; Gaston and Trefler, 1995; Boulhol, 2009), acts 
as a discipline device to reduce quasi-rents and thus e scope of rent-sharing, which is the 
precondition for the existence of unions.  
According to these models, endogenous institutional adjustments should amplify the 
inequality-enhancing effect of skill-biased shocks by reducing the bargaining power of unions 
(Blau and Kahn, 1996), but empirical support for this claim remains scant and indirect at best. 
A major difficulty in examining the endogenous insttutional responses to skill-biased shocks 
is that institutions vary across rather than within countries, making it exceedingly difficult to 
identify the effect of skill-biased shocks on each institution.  
Our paper contributes to filling this gap in the lit rature by taking advantage of the two-tier 
collective bargaining structure of the Italian labor market, whereby the first tier of bargaining 
entails setting minimum wages at the sector and occupation level. The second tier covers firm- 
or local-level agreements to align wages to local productivity in a manner that provides 
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incentives to workers engaged in production processes.2 Both first- and second-level 
bargaining might be affected by globalization and other skill-biased shocks. Unlike previous 
studies, which focus on the second tier of bargaining (Carluccio et al., 2015; Carluccio et al., 
2016) and rent-sharing (Abowd and Lemieux, 1993),3 we examine the impact of globalization 
on the first institutional level, which is the core of collective bargaining. In particular, we focus 
on national contract minimum wages, which are a crucial part of the bargaining process in 
centralized wage regimes, such as those in Europe (Bo ri and Burda, 2009). The idea is that 
such minima represent the main institutional feature ensuring social protection for the most 
vulnerable workers; thus, they are particularly suited to explain the recent political 
consequences of globalization.  
We contribute to the active strand of literature on globalization’s impact on the labor market 
in three ways (among others Autor et al., 2013; Autor e  al., 2014). Above all, we are the first 
to estimate the effect of trade shocks on a specific labor market institution, namely, the 
minimum wages negotiated between trade unions and industrial representatives. Our data allow 
us to express total wages as the observable sum of the minimum wage and other additional 
wage components, including premia derived through the second tier of collective bargaining 
and premia associated with individual bargaining and bonuses, shedding light on the two 
margins of wage adjustment to trade shocks. 
Second, we implement a well-established identification strategy to derive a causal effect 
that exploits exogenous variation in trade exposure fo  the same 3-digit sector in another 
country, the UK (Autor et al., 2013). To carry out the empirical analysis, we build a contract-
level measure of exposure to import penetration in which weights are derived from a large 
worker-level dataset that contains information on the sector and the national contract of each 
worker. These data allow us to determine sectoral exposure to import competition at the 
contract level.  
Third, we differentiate the effect depending on workf ce skills within a collective 
bargaining contract. Based on the assumption supported by the theoretical literature discussed 
above that a trade shock primarily decreases the outside options of unskilled workers, we 
expect the effect of trade on minimum wages to be an increasing function of the share of 
unskilled workers within contracts. 
                                                 
2 Most European labor markets feature a similar two-tiered structure. Two excellent cross-country comparisons 
of the wage bargaining regime based on new datasets re hose of De Caju et al. (2009) and Garnero et al. (2015).  
3 See also Brock and Dobbelaere (2006); Dumont et al. (2006); Boulhol et al. (2011); Dumont et al. (2012) and 
Matano and Naticchioni (2017). 
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We find that wage adjustment occurs mainly through an institutional margin. In particular, 
minimum wages are negatively affected by higher exposure to import competition. The average 
cumulative decrease in minimum wages attributable to import competition is modest in 
absolute terms (-1.54%), but it is relatively large compared to the increase in minimum wages 
over the time period considered (+1.98%). Furthermore, this impact is, as expected, higher in 
national contracts with a greater share of unskilled workers. Importantly, for unskilled workers 
the stronger decline in the bargained minimum wage is not compensated for by a parallel 
increase in the decentralized/individual wage premium for unskilled workers. On the contrary, 
in contracts characterized by a high share of skilled workers, there is no significant reduction 
in the bargained minimum wage caused by import penetration and there is a significant increase 
in the decentralized wage premium, i.e., import competition implies a cumulative increase in 
total wages of between 1.2% and 2.1%. Overall, these r ults highlight not only the expected 
inequality-enhancing effect of endogenous institutional adjustments but also a general increase 
in the labor market vulnerability of unskilled workers. Indeed, unskilled workers lose a portion 
of their “certainty equivalent” without receiving compensation in the form of an increase in the 
risky component of their earnings.   
Recent empirical research on trade and wages has used labor market institutions as a fixed 
and exogenous mediating factor.4 The main recent references are Carluccio et al. (2015) for 
France and Felbermayr et al. (2014) for Germany. Exploiting the virtues of matched employer-
employee datasets, both papers highlight the heterogeneous effects of trade on wages, 
depending on the bargaining regimes (i.e., sector- or firm-level) into which a company sorts 
itself. The closely related paper of Carluccio et al. (2016) examines the endogeneity of labor 
market institutions with respect to trade status but focuses on firm-level (second-tier) 
agreements. We extend and complement their work by estimating the impact of trade on the 
first tier of wage bargaining, which is most closely linked to the insurance role of labor market 
institutions.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the institutional background in 
greater detail. Section 3 presents the data and some descriptive evidence. Section 4 describes 
the identification strategy. Section 5 discusses the results. Section 6 presents the study’s 
conclusions.   
                                                 
4 There is a very broad literature on trade, offshoring and wage inequality. Benchmark references are Yeaple 
(2005), Verhoogen (2008), Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), Amiti et al. (2012), Helpman et al. (2017) and 
Harrigan and Reshef (2015). Additionally, recent theoretical models introduce a frictional labor market with 
centralized or decentralized wage bargaining (Helpman and Itskhoki, 2010; Felbermayr et al., 2012), but labor 




2. Institutional Background  
 
Italy is one of the few large countries within the European Union characterized by a relatively 
weak legal regulation of industrial relations. The main reference law, the so-called Statuto dei 
lavoratori of 1970, was not entered into the regulation of industrial relations, reflecting the 
view that social partners were the only actors in charge of establishing the rules of industrial 
relations, mainly through collective bargaining. This view has been maintained over time, and 
the industrial relations system in Italy remains unregulated by formal laws passed by the 
Government or the Parliament; instead, regulation is left to social partners.  
According to this view, the Italian system of collective bargaining is centered on the role of 
the most representative employers and workers’ organizations with the aim of establishing both 
the structure of collective bargaining and the regulation of national collective agreements. Two 
levels of collective bargaining were introduced in the Protocol of July 1993. The first one 
occurs at the industry-wide level (Contratto Collettivo Nazionale di Lavoro, CCNL), where 
working conditions and wage levels are fixed at the industry level via collective agreements 
between trade unions and employers’ organizations.5 Collective bargaining is simply regulated 
by the general provisions of the civil code governing contracts and obligations. Formally, a 
collective agreement in Italy is binding only for the members of the union(s) signing the 
contract and the firm associates of employers’ organizations. There is no explicit formal 
extension to other workers and firms. Nonetheless, in Italy, the wage floors (minimi tabellari) 
established in collective agreements may be used by labor courts as a reference to determine 
compliance with the provision of Art. 36 of the Italian Constitution, which states that “workers 
have the right to a remuneration commensurate to the quantity and quality of their work and 
in any case such as to ensure them and their families a free and dignified existence”. For this 
reason, minimum wages set in collective agreements are de facto extended to all workers, 
entailing a very high collective bargaining coverage that approaches 100% of workers 
(European Commission, 2014).  
With respect to a statutory minimum wage system, the Italian system sets minimum wages 
for all occupations within a given CCNL contract. Thus, minima are set not only for low-paid 
                                                 
5 Note that the choice of the industry definition of the CCNL is left to the unions and employer representatives, 
and it is not strictly related to standard classifications such as NACE, which implies that for some NACE codes 
(at the 2- or 3-digit levels), there might be various reference national contracts. For instance, within t e same 
NACE code, there might be different contracts for small, medium, and large firms or for craft firms. This 
difference contributes to explaining the imperfect overlapping of CCNL and NACE classes shown in Section 3. 
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workers but also for high-paid workers such as managers and professionals. Nonetheless, while 
each CCNL may contain both high- and low-skilled occupations, bargaining between unions 
and employer representatives is not necessarily homogenous across different occupations 
(livelli di inquadramento). In each renewal of a CCNL, the social parties might decide that the 
wage increase bargained for unskilled occupations is greater than the wage increased bargained 
for high-skilled occupations, or vice versa. Therefo , the relevant level of negotiation for the 
setting of wage floors is the CCNL-by-occupation level, which is the level we consider in this 
paper.  
Whereas the first level of collective bargaining is a med mostly at maintaining worker 
purchasing power over time, decentralized (company or regional) collective bargaining is 
linked to productivity and firms’ economic performance.6 Interestingly, the second tier of 
collective bargaining has always been subordinated to the national level, and its diffusion has 
been fairly limited to the largest firms and the northern regions. Second-level bargaining is not 
compulsory, and it is subject to the in melius or favorability principle: that is, wages and 
working conditions cannot be worse than those agreed to at the industry level.7 Importantly, 
the observed wage variability within a CCNL-by-occupation level does not depend only on 
decentralized bargaining, since all firms can engage in individual bargaining in melius with 
respect to the CCNL, even without a second-level colle tive bargaining contract.  
In recent years, the collective bargaining system has revealed the progressive erosion of 
trade unions and employer associations’ representativeness, increasing noncompliance with 
collective bargaining minimum wages and the emergence of ‘pirate contracts’ signed by 
nonrepresentative social partners (Lucifora and Naticchioni, 2018). Nonetheless, these issues 
will be not examined in this paper because data limitations allow us to cover only the 1995-
2003 period. Nevertheless, this is an advantage for our analysis, as the years covered by our 
data can be considered a period of relative stabiliy for the system of industrial relations 
introduced in 1993, with a much lower incidence of n ncompliance and pirate contracts 
compared to more recent years (Garnero et al, 2015).  
One concern is that our analysis does not consider the surge of China, which has been 
identified as the main driver of structural and political changes in the US (Autor et al., 2013; 
                                                 
6 Note that the national-level contract is bargained between sectoral social partners’ federations, i.e., trade unions 
and employers’ organizations, while firm- or local-level bargaining is conducted mainly by the unitary union 
representative body (Rappresentanze sindacali unitarie or RSU) elected in work councils.  
7 To give an idea of the diffusion of second-level bargaining, according to RIL-AIDA data (from INAPP, Italian 
Institute for Public Policy Analysis), only 3-4% offirms were involved in second-level bargaining aimed at 
increasing wages in the years 2010 and 2014.  
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Autor et al., 2016). However, following the introduction of the Euro, European countries 
experienced an important shock immediately prior to China’s 2001 entry to the WTO. In Italy, 
the introduction of the Euro occurred de facto in 1997 with the re-entry of the Lira to the 
European Monetary System.8 For the large Italian manufacturing sector, the Euro represented 
a critical turning point by stopping the series of c mpetitive devaluations that had been used 
repeatedly in the 1980s and early 1990s to preserve international competitiveness (Basile, 
2001).9  
 
3. Data and Descriptive Evidence 
 
The main data source for this paper is the Italian administrative database provided by the Italian 
National Social Security Institute (INPS). The database follows individuals born on the 10th 
of March, June, September and December, and therefor , it is a representative sample of 
approximately of 1/90th of the working population. It is a matched employer-employee dataset 
that was constructed for the 1995-2003 period by merging the INPS employee information with 
the INPS employer information database. For firms, the dataset contains the following 
information: the plant location (province), the number of employees and the main 3-digit sector 
of the activity. For workers, the available characteristics are age, gender, occupation (white-
collar, blue-collar, and managers), the dates of the beginning and end of the current contract (if 
any), worker status (part-time or full-time), real gross yearly wage, and the number of months, 
weeks and days worked.  
The key advantage of this dataset is that it contains information about the main national 
contract of the employee (CCNL) together with the occupation level (‘livello di 
inquadramento’) in each major contract. Beginning in 2005, this information was no longer 
collected by INPS, and we use the most recent matched employer-employee dataset containing 
information on national contracts and occupations, which was released in 2003. As discussed 
above, since wage adjustments within a major CCNL contract can be heterogeneous across 
occupation levels, our unit of analysis is defined at the level of the contract-occupation 
minimum wage.10 We retrieve information about bargained minimum wages for each (national) 
                                                 
8 Italy reentered the European Monetary System at the end of 1996 with the limited possibility to fluctuate with 
respect to the ECU, and on January 1, 1999, the exchange rate between the Lira and the Euro was set at its
irrevocable level.  
9 Previous studies found that the introduction of the Euro represented an important shock for Italian companies, 
forcing them to adapt their workforce composition ad organizational practices to international standards 
(Bugamelli et al., 2010; Raitano and Vona, 2017).  
10 To focus on a homogenous sample of contracts, we drop the few contracts that are not present throughot the 
time span of our analysis (approximately 2.4% of observations are dropped). 
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contract-occupation level from the National Council for Economics and Labour (CNEL) 
archives.  
We limit our analysis to private employees in the manufacturing sector, which is the sector 
with the greatest exposure to trade shocks. We consider both part-time (converted into full-
time equivalent) and full-time workers aged between 15 and 64 (in their first year in the 
sample). Moreover, we drop workers without information on the minimum wage (23%).11 We 
clean the data further by dropping both missing observations in our variables of interest and 
extreme observations for which the real weekly wage is above (below) the 99th (1st) wage 
percentile. We end up with 315,939 worker-year observations for 64,328 workers. We finally 
collapse the dataset by contract-occupation and year to obtain our estimation sample composed 
of 1,782 observations for 198 contract-occupation levels over the 1995-2003 period.  
Both the annual minimum wage and the (full-time equivalent) worker average annual wage 
by contract-occupation have been deflated using the consumer price index (FOI index “Indice 
dei prezzi al consumo per le famiglie di operai e impiegati” –ISTAT, base year 2002). Annual 
minimum and average wages in real terms are our main dependent variables. 
The main variable of interest is import competition. In line with the vast literature on the 
labor market impact of trade (e.g., Guadalupe, 2007; Bugamelli et al., 2010), we use import 
over turnover to measure import competition. We usedata on total imports from Eurostat 
COMEXT defined at the 3-digit sector level12 for Italy and the UK, and data on turnover from 
Eurostat are available at the 3-digit level from 1995 onward. 
A key step of our empirical analysis is to build a measure of exposure to import competition 
for each detailed national contract-occupation. Theidea is to exploit the relevance of each 
sector within each contract-occupation. While Italian national contracts are mostly defined 
within broad sectoral categories, one specific contract might be used in different 3-digit sectors. 
Table 1A of the Appendix shows that only 9% of contrac -occupations are present in one 3-
digit sector. We define the index of exposure to import competition by national contract-











                                                 
11 We have data on minimum wages for all occupations within the 28 major national contracts, which cover 77% 
of workers and that are relatively more concentrated in larger firms.  
12 Sectors are defined according to the Nace rev1.1 classification for 86 manufacturing sectors. 
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where c refers to the contract-occupation, s refers to the 3-digit sector and t refers to time. The 
index is the weighted average of total imports over turnover at the sector level, with weights 
/ reflecting the relative presence of the sector within a specific national contract-
occupation. In particular, they are computed as the number of contract/occupation-sector-year 
workers over the number of contract/occupation-year workers. In an extension of the analysis, 
we also explore the effect of ICT investments on mii um wages by building a similar measure 
of exposure using EU-KLEMS data. 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics, weighted by the time-average number of workers 
in each contract-occupation, of the variables used in the analysis. The average annual minimum 
wage is 15,011, while the average (gross) annual wage is approximately 20,638 Euros. Their 
ratio (0.73) is quite similar to the Kaitz index of 0.75 (the ratio of minimum to median wages) 
computed for the same sample. This high Kaitz index is a peculiar feature of the Italian labor 
market.13 For the other variables, the average age by contract-occupation is 36. In addition, 
contracts are composed of 25% white-collar workers and managers (75% blue-collar workers), 
while the relative presence of females is 32%, and the median firm size by contract-occupation 
is 74.14 Finally, the average value of imports over turnover is 22%, which is consistent with 
our focus on the manufacturing sector. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Column 3 displays the growth rates for each variable. Both average and minimum wages 
are relatively stagnant over time (see also Figure 1), contrasting with a sharp increase of import 
exposure by 23.3% (Figure 2), which is also associated with the currency reevaluation induced 
by the adoption of the Euro in 1997 (see Bugamelli et al., 2010) and the large increase in ICT 
capital investments. Overall, the freezing in the increase of minimum and annual wages can be 
explained by the worsening Italian competitiveness during the time period of our analysis. The 
remainder of the paper explores this hypothesis, attempting to isolate a particular driver of 
wage stagnation: the surge in import competition. 
 
 [Figure 1 about here] 
                                                 
13 Garnero et al. (2015) report the Kaitz index for 17 EU countries for more recent years around 2010. The Italian 
index is the highest at 0.9, while the cross-country average is 0.55.  
14 The median firm size is higher than that computed in the raw data because the larger national contracts used in 
our analysis are overrepresented in larger firms. Large firms are the main firms involved in international trade 




        [Figure 2 about here] 
 
4. Empirical Strategy 
 
In this section, we detail the empirical strategy used to estimate the impact of import 
competition on the minimum wages and average wages of Italian workers. By comparing the 
two effects, we shed light on the institutional margin of adjustment to trade shocks. We estimate 
the following equation:  
 
ln =  + Ψ′#,%& + 'ln	,%& + ) + * + +,             (1) 
                                                                                                                                 
where c indexes the contract-occupation and t time, + is a standard error term, and #,%& is 
the set of additional controls described in Table 1. Contract-occupation ()	and time (*) fixed 
effects are included to purge our estimates from the influence of unobservable contract 
characteristics and macroeconomic shocks, respectively. ln is either the annual minimum 
wage or the annual average wage, both in logarithm and in real terms. The main variable of 
interest ln	,%& is the 2-year lagged import penetration in the logarithm.  
The choice of the two-year lag is motivated by institutional considerations; in Italy, the 
average length of a collective agreement is two years (De Caju et al., 2009). If a new negotiation 
on minimum wages begins immediately after the previous contract is signed, the social parties’ 
relevant information for establishing the basis of a new agreement is the level of import 
intensity at the beginning of the negotiation, that is, at  − 2. This choice also reflects the fact 
that import data are available with at least a one-year delay to social parties and thus that 
information about imports at  − 2 is relevant at  − 1, the crucial negotiation phase for the 
renewal of the contract. Furthermore, to add weight to larger contracts, our estimates are 
weighted by the time average of the number of workers belonging to a specific contract-
occupation. Standard errors are clustered at the national contract-occupation level.  
In section 5, we show the robustness of our results to different lag structures, weighting 
schemes and clustering levels. Moreover, we discuss in detail two extensions to equation 1, 
including either an additional skill-biased shock (ICT capital) or allowing the effect of imports 
to be heterogeneous depending on the skill level of the contract.  
One issue that must be considered in our analysis is endogeneity, which may arise for at 
least two reasons. First, there could be an issue of r verse causality. For instance, an increase 
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in domestic wages in Italy could push up the wages bargained at the sectoral levels, and for 
this reason, firms might have incentives to source more inputs and/or final products from 
abroad, substituting for higher labor costs with cheaper imports/final products, which would 
lead to an upward bias in the OLS estimates.  
Second, an omitted variables issue might occur, i.e., unobserved shocks might induce a 
correlation between changes in the wages settled in collective bargaining and changes in 
imports. For instance, negative supply shocks in Italy may reduce bargained wages while 
increasing imports, as domestic suppliers become less productive and competitive than foreign 
suppliers, which would induce a downward bias in the OLS estimates. 
As a first step to mitigate these two issues, we include the endogenous variable – import 
penetration in logs – with a lag of 2 years. Neverth less, the problem of persistent and serially 
correlated shocks and persistent trends of the depen nt and endogenous variables may be 
mitigated but not entirely solved by using lagged variables.  
A more compelling way to tackle this issue is to use an instrumental variable approach that 
became standard in the trade literature following the seminal contribution of Autor et al. 
(2013).15 More specifically, we instrument the 2-year lagged import penetration in contract-












We fix the employment weights in 1995 to mitigate th simultaneity bias associated with 
the fact that contemporaneous employment is also affected by import competition. Notice that 
because our endogenous variable is included with a 2-year lag, the first year of our estimate is 
1997. This mitigates concerns about the presence of a simultaneity bias and anticipated trade 
effects on wages.  
This kind of shift-share instrument is intended to is late variation in import penetration 
caused by exogenous changes in supply in the origin cou tries (e.g., China), uncorrelated to 
domestic supply and demand shocks. The key identifyi g assumption is that domestic demand 
and supply shocks in the UK are uncorrelated with those in Italy, which is consistent with the 
                                                 
15 Other examples of studies using this approach are D uth et al. (2014); Hummels et al. (2014); Bloom et al. 
(2016); Colantone et al. (2015); and Colantone et al (2018). 
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well-known fact that the correlation between the UKand the EU business cycles is weaker than 




5.1 Baseline Results.  
Table 2 shows the results of the estimation of equation 1. Columns (1) to (3) present the 
estimates in which the dependent variable is the minimum wage. The first main result of our 
paper is that, as expected, an increase in import competition decreases the minimum wage in 
national contracts in a statistically significant way.16 The elasticity of minimum wages to trade 
is small (-0.014, column (1)) but significantly higer (-0.066) when we apply our favorite IV 
strategy (column 2), suggesting that the OLS coeffici nts are downwardly biased.  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Column (3) reveals that the point estimate remains statistically significant at a conventional 
level when we add the covariates by national contract-occupation described in Table 1, namely, 
the shares of white-collar workers and female workers, the average age of the worker (a proxy 
of experience) and the log of the median firm size (a proxy for both productivity and market 
power). However, we observe a drop of almost 20% in the estimated coefficient, which implies 
that part of the total import effect occurs through induced compositional changes within each 
contract-occupation. According to previous literatue (e.g., Lu and Ng, 2013; Consoli et al., 
2016; Colantone et al, 2018), the main compositional effect is a skill upgrading associated with 
the fact that an increase in international competition forces companies to improve the quality 
of their products and therefore that of their workfce. Our data support this interpretation: the 
share of white-collar workers and managers in a contract is positively correlated with both the 
import competition (0.20) and the minimum wage leve (0.71).   
Columns (4) to (6) replicate the analysis using the av rage wage by contract as the dependent 
variable. In all of the specifications, the effect of import penetration on wages is not statistically 
significant at conventional levels. The lack of an effect on manufacturing wages is consistent 
with the balancing of two forces (Autor et al., 2013): on the one hand, there is a decline in the 
demand of manufacturing jobs induced by import penetration that implies a downward pressure 
                                                 
16 A standard F-test on the instrument strength is report d at the bottom of each table. The test largely passes the 
cut-off value of 10, which is considered the rule-of-thumb for a strong instrument.  
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to wages; on the other hand, there is an upgrading of the workforce skills through a selection 
effect. This result reinforces our main finding: the institutional margin is the main margin 
through which wages adjust to import competition in countries such as Italy that are 
characterized by a two-tiered wage bargaining system.17    
In the Appendix, we also show that our results are robust to small variants of our main 
specification. First, we explore a different specification of the lag structure for the explanatory 
variables, that is, a one-year lag rather than a two-year lag (Table A2). Second, we use the main 
national contract (28) as a cluster unit to account for any form of correlation across the 
occupation-level contracts within a major contract (Table A3). Finally, we weigh our estimate 
for the number of worked weeks rather than for the number of workers (Table A4).  
 
5.2 Extensions.  
Our results are broadly consistent with those of Boulh l et al. (2011) for the UK and Dumont 
et al. (2006) for five large EU countries. However, while in these papers, the adjustment margin 
is on the workers’ bargaining power over the variable quasi-rents of the matching, our analysis 
highlights an adjustment that occurs through a renegotiation of fixed wage floors defined in the 
collective bargaining. Since wage floors represent the insurance component of wages, their 
levels are relatively more important for the welfare of risk-averse workers than for the share of 
quasi-rents. This remark is particularly salient for less-skilled workers because of their 
exposure to other skill-biased shocks such as automati n and because the wage floors represent 
the bulk of their total earnings. 
Based on these insights, there are two natural extensions of our analysis. First, we study the 
heterogeneous effect that depends on the skill leveof the contract (as suggested in Dumont et 
al., 2012). Second, we analyze the effect of technology shocks, which, together with trade, may 
have also affected wage bargaining institutions (Acemoglu et al., 2001).  
The first extension consists of adding to equation (1) the interaction between the index of 
import penetration and the share of white-collar wokers and managers within each contract-
occupation.18 Results are presented in Table 3 and plotted in Figures 3 and 4.19  
                                                 
17 To investigate whether our main result captures a long- rather than a short-term relation, we re-estima e equation 
(1) for a long time horizon, replacing our variables of interest with their 1995-2003 growth rates. Our main 
findings are confirmed and estimates are available upon request. 
18 We use the share of white-collar workers and managers in the contract as proxy for skills because the 
occupational levels (“livello di inquadramento”) within the contract are not defined in a consistent way across 
contracts. It is also difficult to use the CNEL data on contracts to infer an exact skill ranking based on occupational 
levels. 
19 The results presented in Table 3 are unaffected using a one-year time lag, different clustering methods and 
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First, notice that the positive association between skill upgrading and changes in the 
minimum wage is statistically significant at the conventional level. Looking at the effect of 
trade on minimum wages, columns (1)-(3) show that while the baseline effect remains negative 
and higher in magnitude compared to previous estimates, the interaction with the skills share 
is positive and significant at the 1% level.20 Thus, as the share of skilled workers in the natiol 
contract-occupation increases, the negative effect of trade on minimum wages is significantly 
mitigated. Using our preferred specification in column 2, this effect remains negative and 
statistically significant until the 84th percentile of skill intensity. As is clear from Figure 3, 
which plots the derived marginal effects, above that percentile, the effect is not significantly 
different from zero.    
Looking at the effect of trade on average wages (columns 4 to 6), the baseline effect is 
negative and not statistically significant, while the interaction terms are positive and 
statistically significant in the IV specifications (columns 5 and 6). Combining the baseline 
effect with that mediated by skills, the effect of trade becomes positive and significant above 
the 85th percentile (equivalent to a share of white-collar wo kers of 0.58) of the contracts’ skill 
share distribution: for these high-skilled contract-o cupations, international competition leads 
to a statistically significant increase in average wages (see Figure 4).  
The second extension explores the impacts of both ICT and trade on minimum wages. To 
account for exposure to technological change at the contract-occupation level, we use EU-
KLEMS data on sectoral ICT investment over value added at the 2-digit level. For the sake of 
consistency, we use ICT investment in the UK as an instrument and build the contract-
occupation level exposure as for trade. Both measurs a e computed in the same way as for 
trade. 
                                                 
20 The use of two-year lags for all the explanatory variables to mitigate concerns over potential endogeneity in the 
share of white-collar workers and managers. As an altern tive way to check the robustness of our results, we also 
estimate the model fixing this share at the beginning of the period for the specifications in columns 1-2 (Table 3), 
but without being able to estimate the baseline effct of the share of white-collar workers and managers. The 
results are unchanged and are available upon request.  
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Table 4 summarizes the main results of this extension, focusing on the two critical 
specifications: 1) with all controls; 2) with all controls plus the interaction term between skills 
and imports. Our main results for the impact of trade re confirmed, while the diffusion of ICT 
technologies has a positive but not significant impact on bargained wage floors that becomes 
statistically significant in the specifications with the interactions term.  
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
5.3 Discussion.  
This section discusses the magnitude of the estimated effects. Over the entire period of our 
analysis, the share of import over turnover increases by 23.3%. In the absence of such an 
increase in import penetration, minimum wages in real t rms would have grown by an 
additional 1.54%, according to our preferred IV estima e in Table 2, column (2).21 In relative 
terms, the effect is large, representing 78% of the modest increase in the minimum wage 
between 1995 and 2003 (1.98%, see Table 1). In sum, the magnitude of the estimated effect is 
economically meaningful and highlights the inequality-enhancing effect of endogenous 
institutional adjustments.  
Most importantly for relative comparison, our result  underscore highly heterogeneous 
effects across skill groups. The results are illustrated in Figures 3 and 4, which plot the 
estimated elasticities shown in columns (2) and (5) of Table 3, with 95% confidence intervals, 
along the percentiles of the white-collar share distribution. For minimum wages (Figure 3), the 
elasticity ranges from -0.071 (5th percentile) to 0.02  (95th percentile). For total wages (Figure 
4), the corresponding elasticities are -0.016 and 0.090. A visual inspection of these figures 
shows that for both minimum wages and total wages, the magnitude of the effects changes 
substantially around the 85th percentiles of skill intensity. In cumulative terms, the increase in 
trade exposure induced a 1.7% loss in minimum wages in contracts characterized by the highest 
share of unskilled workers22 but no (statistically) significant losses for contracts characterized 
by a share of skilled workers above the 84th percentile. A similar pattern emerges for total 
wages where the positive and significant effect above the 85th percentile of the skilled share 
distribution implies a cumulative increase in wages over the time period considered from 1.2% 
                                                 
21 The 1.54% decrease is obtained by multiplying the elasticity of minimum wages, i.e., -0.066 (column (2) of 
Table 2), and the long-term change in import competition, i.e., 23.3%.  
22 For the cumulative effect, we refer to the impact computed over the whole period, which is obtained by 
multiplying the elasticity of minimum wages for the unskilled workers, i.e., -0.072 (column (2) of Table 3), with 
the long-term change in import competition, i.e., 23.3%.  
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for contracts at the 86th percentile of the skill share distribution to 2.1% for those at the 95th 
percentile,23 while no significant effect is detected below the 86th percentile of the skill share 
distribution.  
The comparison of these effects reveals that risk-averse unskilled workers are the worst off 
in a hypothetical risk-reward plane. Indeed, the nonfixed earnings component does not 
compensate for the decrease in fixed minimum wages, increasing the vulnerability of low-
skilled workers. However, contracts with a high share of skilled workers do not experience a 
significant reduction in the fixed wage and enjoy a significant increase in the nonfixed wage 
premium that is attributable either to individual bargaining or to decentralized collective 
bargaining at the firm/local level. We argue that the joint effect of widening the skill gap, 
increasing vulnerability and uncompensated earnings los es might help explain unskilled 
workers’ turn toward populistic political parties (Autor el al., 2016; Colantone and Stanig, 
2018). 
Furthermore, the shock analyzed in this paper is relativ ly small compared to the dramatic 
increase in Chinese imports after 2003. If labor maket institutions respond linearly to shocks, 
the size of the effects estimated here will increase substantially. In the presence of larger and 
persistent shocks, however, other adaptation margins are likely to become more important, 
notably, an increase in noncompliance rates (such as t at documented in Garnero et al., 2015) 
and the endogenous introduction of pirate contracts imed at reducing labor costs in areas and 
industries characterized by suffering labor markets (Lucifora and Naticchioni, 2018). While 
these important research questions about more recent trends are left for future research, our 
paper underlines that the effects of trade on colletiv  bargaining were already at work in the 




This paper contributes to the literature by investigating an issue that has been generally 
neglected: the impact of import penetration on domestic labor market institutions, particularly 
on the minimum wages settled in the collective bargaining system. We exploit a unique feature 
of the Italian bargaining system by taking advantage of the two-tier bargaining structure of the 
Italian labor market whereby the first tier of bargining entails setting minimum wages at the 
sector and occupation levels to estimate the contract-level response of such minima to trade 
                                                 
23 These effects are obtained by multiplying the elasticity of total wages at the various point of the skill share 
distribution (5% at the 86th percentile and 9% at the 95th percentile) with the long-term change in import 
competition, i.e., 23.3%.  
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shocks. As is now customary in the literature (Autor et al., 2013), we retrieve causal effects 
that use trade exposure in another country (the UK in our case) to isolate the exogenous 
variation in import penetration.  
Three main findings stand out from our analysis. First, wage adjustment occurs mainly 
through an institutional margin: minimum wages settled in collective bargaining are negatively 
affected by higher exposure to import competition. Second, the institutional effect contrasts 
with no effects of trade shocks on total wages, except for contracts with a high share of skilled 
workers, for which the effect is positive and statistically significant. Third, our results highlight 
the increased labor market vulnerability for unskilled workers since the reduction in the 
minimum wage in unskilled-intensive contracts not only is larger than in skill-intensive 
contracts but also is not offset by a parallel increase in the decentralized wage premium.  
We leave to future research the analysis of the timing of the effects on labor market 
institutions (which, due to data availability, is limited to the medium term in our study) and of 
political outcomes. It is possible that the effect of imports on minimum wages depend 
nonlinearly on the size and the persistency of the trade shock. At the same time, the documented 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Mean Std.Dev. Growth Rate  %
Variables
Real annual minimum wage 15,011 2,749 1.98
Real annual total wage 20,638 8,721 1.81
Import penetration (import over turnover) 0.222 0.100 23.34
Share of white-collar workers and managers 0.254 0.292 1.17
Share of female 0.316 0.203 13.48
Mean age 36 4 5.54
Firm size 74 204 0.12
ICT capital over value added 0.024 0.006 26.44
Notes: Statistics weighted by the time-average number of workers for each contract-occupation. Growth
rates are long-term (1995-2003).
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FE IVFE IVFE FE IVFE IVFE
-0.014** -0.066*** -0.054*** 0.003 -0.009 -0.017
[0.006] [0.012] [0.010] [0.009] [0.017] [0.020]
2-Lag share white-collar workers and managers 0.011 0.008
[0.023] [0.042]
2-Lag share females 0.019 -0.062*
[0.019] [0.034]
2-Lag age -0.082** 0.067
[0.034] [0.057]
2-Lag log firm size 0.008** -0.001
[0.003] [0.008]
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 1,386 1,386 1,386 1,386 1,386 1,386
R-squared 0.295 0.051 0.186 0.091 0.088 0.090
Weak identification test (F-value) 217.7 191.8 217.7 191.8
Number of contracts 198 198 198 198 198 198
Standard errors clustered at contract-occupation level in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Table 2: Impact of imports on wages 
Log Minimum Wage Log Total Wage









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FE IVFE IVFE FE IVFE IVFE
-0.023*** -0.072*** -0.062*** -0.007 -0.017 -0.029
[0.007] [0.011] [0.010] [0.010] [0.017] [0.019]
2-Lag log import penetration index*2-Lag share 
white-collar workers and managers 0.039*** 0.094*** 0.086*** 0.041 0.109** 0.122***
[0.011] [0.024] [0.023] [0.026] [0.045] [0.044]
2-Lag share white-collar workers and managers 0.095*** 0.192*** 0.168*** 0.055 0.176* 0.230**
[0.023] [0.042] [0.042] [0.068] [0.100] [0.094]
2-Lag share females 0.012 -0.072**
[0.017] [0.034]
2-Lag age -0.058* 0.100*
[0.035] [0.059]
2-Lag log firm size 0.007** -0.001
[0.003] [0.008]
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 1,386 1,386 1,386 1,386 1,386 1,386
R-squared 0.319 0.164 0.240 0.095 0.084 0.089
Weak identification test (F-value) 31.60 34.13 31.60 34.13
Number of contracts 198 198 198 198 198 198
Standard errors clustered at contract-occupation level in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Table 3: Impact of imports on wages  and interaction with contracts' skill share 
Log Minimum Wage Log Total Wage
2-Lag log import penetration index
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IVFE IVFE IVFE IVFE
-0.029** -0.068*** -0.008 -0.038*
[0.009] [0.012] [0.019] [0.023]
2-Lag log import penetration index*2-Lag share 
white-collar workers and managers 0.111*** 0.160***
[0.027] [0.057]
2-Lag log ICT capital over value added 0.041 0.087** 0.104 0.135*
[0.032] [0.036] [0.067] [0.071]
2-Lag share white-collar workers and managers -0.002 0.184*** -0.027 0.254**
[0.023] [0.051] [0.049] [0.117]
2-Lag share females 0.003 0.001 -0.078** -0.089**
[0.021] [0.020] [0.036] [0.037]
2-Lag age -0.119*** -0.076** 0.025 0.073
[0.033] [0.037] [0.062] [0.066]
2-Lag log firm size 0.008** 0.009** 0.001 0.001
[0.004] [0.004] [0.008] [0.009]
Time dummies yes yes yes yes
Observations 1,386 1,386 1,386 1,386
R-squared 0.104 0.101 0.055 0.027
Weak identification test (F-value) 18.91 15.58 18.91 15.58
Number of contracts 198 198 198 198
Log Minimum Wage Log Total Wage
2-Lag log import penetration index
Standard errors clustered at contract-occupation level in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Note: 95% confidence intervals reported. Elasticities computed using coefficient estimates from column (2) 





Note: 95% confidence intervals reported. Elasticities computed using coefficient estimates from column (5) 
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Table A1: Distribution of contracts by sector (3-digit level)
1995 2003
Number of sectors % %
1 9.6 9.09
Between 2 and 3 12.63 14.65
Between 4 and 6 15.66 23.24
Between 7 and 10 16.67 13.14
Between 11 and 20 30.33 21.75
Over 20 15.11 18.13
Number of contracts 198
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FE IVFE IVFE FE IVFE IVFE
-0.013 -0.079*** -0.065*** 0.002 -0.024 -0.022
[0.009] [0.018] [0.015] [0.010] [0.016] [0.017]
1-Lag share white-collar workers and managers 0.028 0.067
[0.029] [0.053]
1-Lag share females 0.014 -0.125***
[0.020] [0.039]
1-Lag age -0.081** 0.018
[0.039] [0.050]
1-Lag log firm size 0.009** 0.018**
[0.004] [0.008]
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 1,584 1,584 1,584 1,584 1,584 1,584
R-squared 0.400 0.167 0.286 0.147 0.137 0.158
Weak identification test (F-value) 277.5 255.0 277.5 255.0
Number of contracts 198 198 198 198 198 198
Standard errors clustered at contract-occupation level in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Table A2: Impact of imports on wages. One-year lag specification
Log Minimum Wage Log Total Wage











(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FE IVFE IVFE FE IVFE IVFE
-0.014 -0.066*** -0.054*** 0.003 -0.009 -0.017
[0.010] [0.023] [0.018] [0.011] [0.018] [0.022]
2-Lag share white-collar workers and managers 0.011 0.008
[0.025] [0.046]
2-Lag share females 0.019 -0.062
[0.016] [0.039]
2-Lag age -0.082* 0.067
[0.043] [0.063]
2-Lag log firm size 0.008 -0.001
[0.005] [0.009]
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 1,386 1,386 1,386 1,386 1,386 1,386
R-squared 0.295 0.051 0.186 0.091 0.088 0.090
Weak identification test (F-value) 89.38 80.90 89.38 80.90
Number of contracts 198 198 198 198 198 198
Standard errors clustered at main contract level in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The number of main contracts is 28.
Table A3: Impact of imports on wages. Standard errors clustered by main contract
Log Minimum Wage Log Total Wage
2-Lag log import penetration index
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FE IVFE IVFE FE IVFE IVFE
-0.014** -0.065*** -0.054*** 0.007 -0.010 -0.012
[0.006] [0.012] [0.010] [0.010] [0.015] [0.017]
2-Lag share white-collar workers and managers 0.015 0.038
[0.023] [0.036]
2-Lag share females 0.018 -0.038
[0.019] [0.032]
2-Lag age -0.079** 0.060
[0.035] [0.046]
2-Lag log firm size 0.009** 0.008
[0.004] [0.007]
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 1,386 1,386 1,386 1,386 1,386 1,386
R-squared 0.300 0.067 0.192 0.077 0.071 0.075
Weak identification test (F-value) 224.9 201.2 224.9 201.2
Number of contracts 198 198 198 198 198 198
Standard errors clustered at contract-occupation level in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Table A4: Impact of imports on wages. Estimates weighted by number of worked weeks 
Log Minimum Wage Log Total Wage
2-Lag log import penetration index
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